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Nothing’s Paradox in Donne’s “Negative Love”
and “A Nocturnal Upon S. Lucy’s Day”
Sean Ford
University of Alabama

J

OHN DONNE’S COMPLICATED USE OF PARADOX is nowhere more
inviting than in the grammatical and conceptual use of the word
“nothing,” especially when Donne chooses to give this noun the quality of substance and presence, rather than using it to denote the absence of
anything.1 Two poems in particular, from the Songs and Sonets, give affirmative existence to a nothing in order to make distinct arguments regarding the status of an existing thing. Both “Negative Love” and “A Nocturnal
Upon S. Lucy’s Day, being the shortest day” rely on this paradox to give a
precise definition of the word nothing. The definition arises from two overlapping and intersecting discourses called paradox and negative theology.
The modern meaning of paradox, it seems, was being solidified in the
period of the English Renaissance. Rosalie Colie’s Paradoxia Epidemica is
the most extensive treatment of the subject to date. Colie displays the various conceptions and uses of paradox in Donne’s age. Its originary use
names a statement that goes against received opinion.2 Cicero’s Paradoxa
Stoicorum, which circulated widely in the Renaissance, gives proofs for
statements such as “The life of virtue is the completely happy life” (Paradox 2) and “Only the wise man is rich” (Paradox 6).3 His paradoxes show
both the effectiveness of the use of this figure and its close relationship to
irony. These Stoic paradoxes accomplish two things: by defending the
creeds of the Stoics, they claim to go against prevailing opinion; yet by
presenting the statements in ways that would likely accord with “common
belief,” they expose, and go against, common practice. Undoubtedly the
revival of these paradoxes had the same effect in the Renaissance as they
had upon their original readers.
Erasmus’s The Praise of Folly (1511) makes use of this primary sense of
paradox, while also delighting in rhetorical paradox, both praising an
1I would like to acknowledge the support of the Hudson Strode Program in Renaissance Studies at the University of Alabama, whose Grant money aided my opportunity to
research and revise this essay for publication.
2Rosalie L.Colie, Paradoxia Epidemica: The Renaissance Tradition of Paradox, 9 (Princeton University Press, 1966). I owe some of the following examples to Colie’s study.
3Cicero, Cicero: On Stoic Good and Evil, trans. & ed. M. R. Wright (Warminster: Aris
& Phillips, Ltd., 1991), 83, 101.
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“indefensible” topic as well as supporting “publicly disapproved propositions.”4 Folly’s analysis of the theologians (more than the last third of the
text) gives many instances of these moves: “O marvelous prerogative of
theologians, if to speak incorrectly is reserved to them alone!”; “To work
miracles is primitive and old-fashioned, hardly suited to our times”; “Who
has not learned that in proportion as a good is more widespread it is
greater?”; “The Christian religion on the whole seems to have a kinship
with some sort of folly, while it has no alliance whatever with wisdom”;
“Peter received the keys, received them from One who did not commit
them to an unworthy person, and yet I doubt that he ever understood—
for Peter never did attain to subtlety—that a person who did not have
knowledge could have the key to knowledge.”5
These last two examples are selected because, in addition to functioning as rhetorical paradoxes, they are both a form of semantic and logical
paradox, and thus are more recognizably paradoxical today. Furthermore,
each borrows from and participates in the second discourse with which
this paper is concerned. The “folly” of religion argued in an encomium to
folly and the proposition that ignorance can hold the “key” to “knowledge” are distillations from a negative theology.6 John Donne (who wrote
his own prose paradoxes) would, in the Songs and Sonets, make extensive
use of “paradox” in all these forms—rhetorical, semantic, logical, and religio-mystico-metaphysical.
Felicitously, the origins in Western thought of both “paradox” (in all
senses of the word) and of “negative theology” (as it would come to be
called) can be situated in Plato’s dialogue, Parmenides.7 In this dialogue
of the one and the many, Parmenides inaugurates a method founded upon
the category being/non-being: “you must not only hypothesize, if each
thing is, and examine the consequences of that hypothesis; you must also
hypothesize, if that same thing is not.”8 The argument regarding the
“one,” which is investigated from both sides of the hypothesis, holds up
on both sides, thus forcing Parmenides to ascribe a kind of being to notbeing. The unworkable either/or effects a collapse of the binary being/
not-being, and a paradoxical conclusion that helps pave the way for a negative theology:

4Colie, Paradoxia, 3, 4.
5Desiderius Erasmus, The

Praise of Folly, trans. Hoyt Hopewell Hudson (New York:
The Modern Library, 1941) 85, 99, 105, 118, 80.
6These statements are especially reminiscent of the “Learned Ignorance” espoused by
Nicholas of Cusa (see below on ignorance and on “knowledge” and “understanding”).
7I owe this lead to Rosalie L. Colie, “The Rhetoric of Transcendence,” Philosophical
Quarterly 43 (1964): 145–70.
8Plato, Plato: Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing
Company, 1997), 370.
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So if one is not, none of the others is conceived to be one or
many, since, without oneness, it is impossible to conceive of
many…. Therefore, if one is not, the others neither are nor are
conceived to be one or many…. Then if we were to say, to sum
up, “if one is not, nothing is,” wouldn’t we speak correctly?…Let
us then say this—and also that, as it seems, whether one is or is not,
it and the others both are and are not, and both appear and do not
appear all things in all ways, both in relation to themselves and in
relation to each other (my emphasis).9
The indefinitely definite conclusions of Parmenides display paradox par
excellence while showing also a way to respond to paradox, that is, by not
resolving it.
The “Negative Theology,” or via negativa, takes various forms in
writings of religious philosophers from the early Christian period, through
the Middle Ages, and into the Renaissance, yet it pervades many non-religious discourses (philosophical, literary, etc.). Frederick Copleston
describes the doctrine thus: It “rejects any real positive knowledge of God:
we know in truth only what God is not, for example, that He is not a
genus, not a species, that He is beyond anything of which we have had
experience or which we can conceive. We are justified in predicating perfections of God, but at the same time we must remember that all names we
apply to God are inadequate—and so, in another sense, inapplicable.”10
I will focus on two of the major historical figures in this discourse in
an effort to lay out certain logical propositions incorporated into their
works that will give insight into John Donne’s paradoxical use of “nothing.” From the texts and letters of the Pseudo-Dionysius (ca. 500), I
extract from only The Mystical Theology, in which the author offers a way
of praising “the Transcendent One in a transcending way, namely through
the denial of all beings.” Denial becomes affirmation. Dionysius gives an
analogy: “We would be like sculptors who set out to carve a statue. They
remove every obstacle to the pure view of the hidden image, and simply by
this act of clearing aside they show up the beauty which is hidden.”11 The
statue, in this case, impossible to be conceived of as an object, properly
existing, may perhaps be thought of as a kind of “transcendent” knowledge or access to a non-being, and thus as that non-being itself.
The final chapter of The Mystical Theology offers a presentation of
denials that serves to define God. The author concludes: The “supreme
Cause [God] falls neither within the predicate of nonbeing nor of being.
9Plato, Complete Works, 397.
10Frederick Copleston, S.J.,

The History of Philsophy, vol. 2, Mediaeval Philosophy:
Augustine to Scotus (Westminster: The Newman Press, 1950), 26–27.
11Pseudo-Dionysius, Pseudo-Dionysius: Complete Works, trans. Colm Luibheid (New
York: Paulist Press, 1987), 138.
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Existing beings do not know it as it actually is and it does not know them
as they are. There is no speaking of it, nor name nor knowledge of it.
Darkness and light, error and truth—it is none of these. It is beyond every
assertion and denial….”12
These statements of the Pseudo-Dionysius prefigure the De docta
ignorantia of fifteenth-century thinker, Nicholas of Cusa, who cites
Dionysius frequently. His doctrine “Of Learned Ignorance” (the title of
one work) governs the writer’s entire corpus. His writing is performative
exercise, a striving to attain an ignorance that is greater than learning, thus
to gain access to an incomprehensible deity. His metaphysical speculations
into the nature of God rely on a logic of paradox, coincidentia oppositorum,
the co-incidence of opposites. The fundamental category, maximum/minimum, extends (or includes) the category of being: “Existence and nonexistence can be equally predicated of all that which is conceived to exist;
and non-existence cannot to any greater degree than existence be affirmed
of all that is conceived not to exist. But the absolute maximum, in consequence, is all things and, whilst being all, it is none of them; in other
words, it is at once the maximum and minimum of being.”13 The greatest
maximum approaches “all” to the same degree that the greatest minimum
approaches “none.” Stretching these categories until they “coincide”
(today we might say deconstruct) necessitates canceling-out the opposition
being/not-being. The greatest maximum equals the greatest minimum,
and therefore each negates the other, negating with them the metaphysical
oppositions maximum/minimum, being/non-being, all/none.
The central and oft-repeated paradox in Cusa’s work (which is also
methodological) predicates these linguistic and ontological paradoxes.
Citing Dionysius, he says of God that He is “known but that no mind or
intelligence comprehends Him.”14 The rift between “knowledge,” on the
one hand, and “understanding” or “comprehension,” on the other, is a
paradox, in every sense of the word. It also yields a prescriptive formula
that delimits (or expands) one’s reaction to, and relationship with, paradox. In other words, there are (at least) three ways to respond to a paradox:
1) run away; 2) seek to resolve it; 3) embrace it. Like Plato’s Parmenides,
Cusa chooses the third response. It is also the course we are taking in this
investigation.
The ubiquitous Saint Augustine investigates the nominative status of
the word “nothing” in the dialogue, “Concerning the Teacher.” In the
opening pages of the dialogue, Augustine rejects his son Adeotatus’s claim
that nihil (nothing) signifies “that which is not”: “Perhaps you are right.
12Pseudo-Dionysius, Complete Works, 141.
13Nicolas Cusanus, Of Learned Ignorance, trans.

University Press, 1954), 13.
14Cusanus, Of Learned Ignorance, 35.

Fr. Germain Heron (New Haven: Yale

Nothing’s Paradox in Donne 103
But I cannot agree with you because of your recent admission, namely,
that a sign is not a sign unless it signifies something. And that which is not
cannot in any way be something.”15 Augustine concisely exposes the fundamental grammatical paradox of nothing, on the level of the word, thus
acknowledging his awareness of and complicity in a kind of negative theology. In his classic treatise on language and reading, De Doctrina Christiana, Augustine acknowledges and then overcomes the inherent
limitations of language: “Yet although nothing can be spoken in a way
worthy of God, he has sanctioned the homage of the human voice, and
chosen that we should derive pleasure from our words in praise of him.”16
It is worth noting that Donne’s position on this issue, in his sermons,
always immensely sensitive to the complications and limitations of language, is virtually identical to Augustine’s statement. He fully realizes the
inherent problems with language, but, guided by the Gospel of John, he
takes refuge in The Word, entering into knowledge of God thereby.17 It
may be surmised that Donne’s brilliant logical gymnastics in the Songs and
Sonets, especially with regard to the paradox of nothing, his clever and rigorous use of a negative theology, are not necessarily consistent with the
studious and serious theological metaphysics found in the sermons. While
Donne the profane poet may cheerfully embrace the nothingness of language and existence, Donne the sermonizer must strive to overcome it.18
Thus we return to the word nothing, the locus in quo and sub verba of
negative theology, for which Jacques Derrida, refusing to call it a “discourse” and refraining from defining the phrase, offers a “provisional
hypothesis” that is appropriate here. He suggests that negative theology:
consists of considering that every predicative language is inadequate to the essence, in truth to the hyperessentiality (the being
beyond Being) of God; consequently, only a negative (“apophatic”) attribution can claim to approach God, and to prepare us
for a silent intuition of God. By a more or less tenable analogy,
one would thus recognize some traits, the family resemblance of
15Augustine, Basic Writings of Saint Augustine, ed. Whitney J. Oates (New York:
Random House, 1948), 1:363.
16Augustine, On Christian Teaching, trans. R. P. H. Green (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1997), 11.
17See especially the following sermons in George R. Potter & Evelyn M. Simpson, eds.,
The Sermons of John Donne, 10 vols. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953–62), vol.
3 (1957), n. 9, 211–13; vol. 5 (1959) n. 16, 322–24; vol. 7 (1954), n. 13, 344–48.
18 Frank Kermode, in discussing Donne’s “Nocturnal,” says, “As he extracted the
notion of absolute privation in alchemical terms, Donne must have been thinking of the Cabbalistic description of God as the nothing, the quintessence of nothing; here a keen and prejudiced ear might discover one of his blasphemies. But it is more interesting, I think, that
Donne the poet is claiming what Donne the theologian calls impossible….” Frank Kermode,
“John Donne,” in British Writers and Their Works No. 4, ed. Bonamy Dobrée (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1964), 23.
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negative theology, in every discourse that seems to return in a
regular and insistent manner to this rhetoric of negative determination….19

John Donne makes this “return in a regular and insistent manner.” In
many places in the Songs and Sonets Donne’s rhetoric centers upon the
grammatical paradox of the word nothing.20 Lines 25–26 of “The Broken
Heart” provide one basic formulation of the word’s inherent paradox:
“Yet nothing can to nothing fall / Nor any place be empty quite.” These
two clauses form an implicit neither-nor relationship that can be read as
“Neither can anything fall to nothing, nor can any place be quite empty.”
This literal reading preserves the sense of the poem, because the “place”
referred to is that in which the speaker’s heart should reside, and the
poem concludes that the missing heart is not ultimately absent, but
merely transformed: “Therefore I think my breast hath all / Those pieces
still, though they be not unite” (27–28). Nevertheless, the inherent
semantic play on the word yields an affirmative statement arising from a
double negative: Whether nothing can or cannot fall to nothing, nothing
is, nevertheless, granted a specific affirmative existence. Though “The
Broken Heart” reveals the paradox of nothing through a buried play on
words, the two poems dealt with in this essay rely upon precisely this affirmative use of the noun for their meaning. “Nothing” is a noun that is a
thing that is no thing.
The intersecting discourses of paradox and negative theology provide
an accurate framework for Donne’s poem, “Negative Love.” This poem
gives a description of the speaker’s love by, first, distinguishing the
speaker’s love from other love (stanza 1), and then attempting to define
that love (stanza 2). The definition of stanza 2 concerns us here. It relies
on both grammatical affirmation of the word nothing and on a philosophical proposition which asserts that perfection can at best be articulated in
negatives. The negative love in this poem represents Donne’s compact
expression of the via negativa. The “hidden statue” of the Pseudo-Dionysius finds its parallel in the love described in the poem, which pushes negative definition to its extremes to argue that denying all positive attributes
19Jacques Derrida, “How to Avoid Speaking: Denials,” trans. Ken Frieden, in Derrida
and Negative Theology, ed. Harold Coward & Toby Foshay (Albany: State University of New
York Press, 1992), 74. In addition to this essay, Derrida has recently given explicit attention
to the negative theology. See also the essays collected in Jacques Derrida, On the Name,
trans. Ian Mcleod, ed. Thomas Dutoit (Stanford University Press, 1995) and Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death, trans. David Wills (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995).
20In the fifty-five poems that comprise the Songs and Sonets, fourteen contain at least
one use of the word “nothing,” twelve contain the word “none,” and thirty-four use the
word “all” one or more times. All quotations from Donne’s poetry will be cited in the text,
by line number in accordance with the Penguin text. John Donne, John Donne: The Complete
English Poems, ed. A.J. Smith (London: Penguin Books, 1971).

Nothing’s Paradox in Donne 105
ultimately leads to nothingness. In doing so, it explicitly accepts Cusa’s
model paradox response by explicitly embracing (not resolving) the paradox of nothing. The second stanza of “Negative Love” makes its argument elliptically. It uses non-specific pronouns, making affirmative
statements of negative things. The stanza follows:
If that be simply perfectest
Which can by no way be expressed
But negatives, my love is so.
To all, which all love, I say no.
If any who decipher best,
What we know not, ourselves, can know,
Let him teach me that nothing; this
As yet my ease, and comfort is,
Though I speed not, I cannot miss. (10–18)
The stanza is comprised of two if-then statements, between which lies a
specific rejection that joins them together. They are followed by a mysterious final consequent. The first statement (10–12) contains both a conditional syllogism concerning the perfect love, and a declarative statement
defining the speaker’s love. The speaker’s love is that which “can by no
way be expressed / But negatives.” The “if” declares that the perfection
of the speaker’s love be contingent upon an abstract and hypothetical designation of perfect love.
The fourth line complicates, not the conditionally perfect love, but
the stated love: “To all, which all love, I say no.” Though the precise referent for “all” in both uses is ambiguous, the line is definitely a negation
of something called “all,” suggesting that the speaker embraces its opposite, which is, in fact, what happens.
In the second if-then statement (14–16), the speaker asks to be taught
a “nothing.” The request offers a hypothetical challenge to anyone who
can decipher the unknown nothing and then teach it. This knowledge, if
possible, would be knowledge of a nothing: “Let him teach me that nothing.” In Donne’s via negativa, “that nothing” is “that” “perfectest love”
hypothesized in the initial conditional. The “perfectest love” (here, love
between two people) stands in the position held by God in a negative theology. (The title of this poem in several manuscripts is “The Nothing.”)
The relationships in this poem among “deciphering,” “knowing,” and
“teaching” are reminiscent of, though not identical with, Cusa’s paradoxical distinction between “knowing” and “understanding.”
The final lines of the poem (17–18) present an affirmation of negative
love, and a requisite acceptance of the impossibility of “teaching” “that
nothing”: “this / As yet my ease, and comfort is, / Though I speed not,
I cannot miss.” “This” refers to the speaker’s assertion, “Though I speed
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not, I cannot miss.” “This” is “my ease, and comfort” because the acceptance of “negative love” includes a buried premise: if one fundamentally
cannot miss something, neither can one fundamentally make (“express,”
“know,” “be taught,” “understand”) that thing (that love, “that nothing”), and vice versa. This premise yields four logical possibilities: 1) If one
can (may) make something, one cannot (may not) miss it; 2) If one cannot
(may not) make something, one can (may) miss it; 3) If one can (may)
make something, one can (may) miss it; 4) If one cannot make something,
one cannot miss it. The fourth proposition (the double negative) is
affirmed by the argument in “Negative Love.” Thus the speaker resolves
the conditional and hypothetical propositions by not resolving the paradox: “Nothing,” here = perfect love, which would come into existence, as
“nothing,” only if it could be deciphered and taught.21
“The Nothing” in “Negative Love” names the poem, in so far as its
argument gives a definition of the speaker’s love as nothing. Donne’s
“Nocturnal Upon S. Lucy’s Day” is a more complicated treatment of
nothing, because the word “nothing” refers to and defines the speaker.
The speaker deserves our attention, for the poem’s argument is presented
as a gradual, persistent self-identification and self-definition. Frank Kermode says of this poem, “the argument goes in search of a definition of
absolute nothingness; yet the cause of the poem is grief at the death of a
mistress.”22 If one “goes in search” of its definition by approaching the
speaker’s self-referential claims through a consideration of the conditions
outlined so far, an identity emerges (for speaker and poem), a “nothing,”
with more clarity than is generally supposed.
In recent decades of Donne scholarship, it has become increasingly
apparent that Donne’s speakers should not always be confused with
Donne the man or the poet. Biographical readings have given way to comparisons, for instance, between the speakers of the Songs and Sonets and the
traditional Petrarchan lover, variously represented in the sonnet sequences
of Sidney and Spenser. Helen Gardner’s note that “Break of Day” seems
spoken from a woman’s perspective has resulted in some interpretations
that complicate the identity of other speakers. However, the biographical
assumptions about the speaker of the “Nocturnal” have not been contested. It is unanimously considered to be, if not Donne himself, at least
the persona of a grieving lover who has been ruined by love and then
somehow “re-begot” out of that ruin. Tilottama Rajan, for instance, in a
“deconstructive” analysis of Donne’s general employment of the word
21See Cusanus, Of Learned Ignorance, 17, regarding Cusa’s exhaustive propositions
concerning “the maximum truth on the absolute maximum itself: it is or it is not; it is and it
is not; it neither is nor is it not.”
22Kermode, “John Donne,” 21. Considering Donne’s larger work, while speaking of
the “Nocturnal,” Kermode also suggests that “the violent paradoxes on All and Nothing…belong to Donne’s mental habit,” 23.
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“nothing,” concludes that Donne uses the word to project an assessment
of himself as well as of his poetry. Rajan claims (for reasons unclear to me)
that “[f]or the Metaphysicals the words in a poem are not things, except
when the wit of a poem is (as it is for Herbert) the wit of God.”23 Roy
Booth’s essay on “nothing” in Donne’s poetry focuses on Donne’s own
“obsessive” “self-identification with nothing,” and he cites John Carey in
naming Donne “the extraordinary nothing of the ‘Nocturnal.’”24
Neither the object of the poem (“her”) nor the speaker (“I”) are
clearly determined through these pronouns. Only the addressees, “you,
who shall lovers be,” are explicitly named. I see no cause for giving the
speaker an autobiographical, or even an animate, identity. Fixing the
speaker as a person creates some serious problems, while depersonalizing
the speaker opens the way for an impressive demonstration of the logic of
a negative theology. If one defers ascribing animate existence to the
speaker, another option becomes available: The speaker of the poem is the
poem itself. Further, the “I” of the “Nocturnal” is the paradox of the
being of nothing, not to be riddled, but to be embraced. The poem is the
paradox, speaking in the first person, defining itself. To explore how this is
possible and what it may mean requires some basic preliminary claims.
However the poem may be defined (nocturnal, vigil, lesson in alchemy),
the “Nocturnal” is organized according to a gradual definition of the
identity of the speaker, developed systematically, and without contradiction, in the poem’s five stanzas. That is, the speaker’s claims should not be
interpreted as random associations, but may be held to a strict developmental progression. Three sets of oppositions contribute to the formation
of this identity: contrasts between the speaker and other things, present
tense statements set against the past and the future, and affirmative and
negative declarations about the present.
Each stanza gives a dominant statement of the speaker, in the first
person singular, using the copulate “to be”: I am an “epitaph,” “I am
every dead thing,” “I…am the grave / Of all, that’s nothing,” “I am… /
Of the first nothing,” and “I am none.” These are contrasted, in each
stanza, with a dominant other: “all these,” “you who shall lovers be,” “all
others,” “all,” and “You lovers.” The set of contrasts opposes some “nothing” (the speaker) to some “all” outside of the speaker. The careful use of
tenses allows for delineation of a prior existence or form of existence that
is in direct contrast to present identity. It is referred to in stanza two and
described in stanza three. The descriptions of stanza three, of weeping, of
souls, of bodies, suggest the speaker to have been a living human lover,
ruined by love. Yet previous human existence can do no more in determining present identity then to affirm what the speaker is not. This structural
23Tilottama Rajan, “‘Nothing Sooner Broke’: Donne’s Songs and Sonnets as Self-Consuming Artifact,” ELH 49 (1982): 808.
24Roy Booth, “John Donne: Ideating Nothing,” English 37 (1988): 205, 206.
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approach is an exercise in via negativa, where the speaker gains present
identity to the extent with which it is contrasted both to the “other” in
each stanza and to the attributes it once had.
Future tense also reveals the contrast between the speaker and “you
who shall lovers be,” fixing the moment of the poem—“the year’s midnight, and…the day’s”; “this hour”—as a perpetual now. This perpetual
now, in addition to drawing attention to the metalinguistic exercise of
reading poetry, gives the poem a temporal definition that mirrors theological systems of the negative way. In Nicholas of Cusa’s general metaphysics
(non-separable from the divine), “all time is comprised in the present or
‘now.’”25 Augustine, in the Confessions, asks,
What, then, is time? If no one ask me, I know; if I wish to explain
to him who asks, I know not. Yet I say with confidence, that I
know that if nothing passed away, there would not be past time;
and if nothing were coming, there would not be future time; and
if nothing were, there would not be present time. Those two
times, therefore, past and future, how are they, when even the
past now is not, and the future is not as yet?26
The present “I am” statements of the “Nocturnal” provide another
kind of “negative identity,” either by explicitly stating what the speaker is
not (negation), or by stating that what the speaker is is a kind of nothing
(negative affirmation). These give a forceful definition of the speaker’s
current status, and should be placed together, not as various stages or
types of existence, but as a comprehensive statement of existence in the
perpetual now. The poem’s affirmative and negative statements follow:
Affirmative:
I am the “epitaph” for the spent sun and the dry, lifeless, buried
world (3–9)
I am a thing that can be studied (10)
“I am every dead thing, / In whom love wrought new alchemy”
(12–13)
“I…am the grave / Of all, that’s nothing” (21–22)
“I am… / Of the first nothing, the elixir grown” (28–29)
“…I am none” (37)

25See
26See

Cusanus, Of Learned Ignorance, 77.
Augustine, Writings, 76.
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Negative:
I am not a man (30)
I am not a beast, a plant, a stone (32–33)
I am not “an ordinary nothing” (35)
It is difficult to apply any of these self-definitions to animate, human,
existence. The first two affirmative statements are explicitly textual: I am
an epitaph, and I am a thing to be studied. These point to the poem itself,
and thus contribute to two buried claims: I am a nocturnal, I am a poem:
“I am a text.” The four subsequent affirmative statements do not make
specific claims to a textual identity. Instead, each defines the speaker
according to increasing stages towards, and culminating in, nothingness.
The first two of these assert a nothingness that is directly connected to,
but specifically lacking, animate existence. The third is a genitive that
states the speaker’s existence to be of (is born from, comes from) “the first
nothing.” The final affirmation unequivocally states, “I am none.” These
stages toward nothingness follow a negative logic in keeping with the
Pseudo-Dionysius’s (as well as Cusa’s) metaphysics of denying. The denials, Dionysius says, “climb” up towards transcendent knowledge, that is,
non-being: “But my argument now rises from what is below up to the
transcendent, and the more it climbs, the more language falters, and when
it has passed up and beyond the ascent, it will turn silent completely, since
it will finally be at one with him who is indescribable.”27
The meaning of the poem’s final affirmation, which may seem ambiguous, receives its definitiveness from the three negations offered in stanza
four. The first two negations deny animate existence, and the third, “I am
not an ordinary nothing,” proves to be a buried affirmation, both by the
logic of the poem and by the paradoxical logic of the word nothing. The
presence of the adjective “ordinary” forces, by grammatical necessity, that
the statement mean “I am a non-ordinary or extra-ordinary nothing.” The
speaker’s grammatical existence emerges as a proposition with a threestage consequent: “I am not an ordinary nothing,” therefore, “I am a
non-ordinary nothing,” therefore I am a “nothing that is something.”
The final affirmation, “I am none,” can be taken to mean “I am none of
these things” (man, beast, ordinary nothing); but it also states, simply and
more plausibly within the logic of the poem, “I am nothing.”
The speaker’s identity, then, depends upon an acceptance of the grammatical necessity that nothing, a noun, signifies something. It remains to
be understood how “nothing” can signify a literary text. However, this
double assertion, this knowledge, avoids a host of confusing interpreta27See

Pseudo-Dionysius, Complete Works, 139.
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tions made regarding the speaker of Donne’s poem. For an example I turn
to an article called “Donne’s Riddles,” which seeks to “balance the identification of the grieving lover or husband against another central concern
of the poem—the spiritual deprivation of the speaker, a condition defined
by his apparent physical illness and recovery.”28 The author, Alison Rieke,
later offers this reading: “In stanza four, he cannot determine whether he
is man or beast because he cannot see his own ‘properties.’ He thinks his
‘body must be here,’ but his own shadows, light, and body are not sensible
to him. Finally, he repeats ‘I am None; nor will my Sunne renew,’ feeling
again the despair of his exclusion from seasonal renewal and the sun’s
light.”29
According to the logic proposed in this essay, these lines can be interpreted quite literally, without contradiction, and without an appeal to
biography. I paraphrase lines 30–37 as follows: If I were a man, I would
know that I was one; If I were a beast, a plant, or a stone, I would have
some ends or some means, or would be invested with some “properties”;
If I were an ordinary nothing, as a shadow is (an example and not a reference to the self of the speaker), “a light, and body must be here”; But I am
nothing, and my sun will not renew (literally, because “I am a Nocturnal”).
If the speaker is a “nothing,” and at the same time a poem, what
meaning results? Go back to the first line of stanza two: “Study me then,
you who shall lovers be / At the next world, that is, at the next Spring”
(10–11). Stanza two provides both the cause and the method of the
speaker’s coming into existence as an object of study; it is described as a
rebirth. Love is named as the cause of “ruin.” Rebirth is an increasingly
articulate description of nothingness that gains pragmatic value as the
object to be studied by “you who shall lovers be.” Addressed to future lovers, the poem is an image of the nothing they are destined to become after
love has ruined and “rebegot” them.30 Kathleen Dolan, in an interesting
analysis of what she calls a “paradoxical meditation on ‘nothingness,’” uses
the alchemical figures of the poem to suggest that the poet, as the “first
nothing,” “prepares for the soul’s ascent.”31 Though Dolan is not alone
in foreseeing the speaker’s future resurrection, it seems clear to me that
the rebirth has already occurred—“I am rebegot” (17)—and that the
future, for the speaker as well as the poem, is non-existent: “nor will my
sun renew” (37).
28Alison Rieke, “Donne’s Riddles,” Journal of English and Germanic Philology 83
(1984): 14.
29Rieke, “Donne’s Riddles,” 19.
30As a visible warning to lovers who “read” this object, the “Nocturnal” has a parallel
with several other Songs and Sonets. Both “Valediction: Of the Book” and “The Relic”
present themselves as documents to be studied.
31 Kathleen H. Dolan, “Materia in Potentia: The Paradox of the Quintessence in
Donne’s ‘A Nocturnal Upon S. Lucies Day,’” Renascence 32 (1979): 13–20.
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Stanza three, the poem’s middle stanza, highlights the speaker’s nothingness in two ways: it contrasts the speaker to “All others, [who] from all
things, draw all that’s good” (19), and contrasts the speaker’s present
existence to a past one. The speaker is “the grave, / Of all, that’s nothing”
(21–22). The contrast depends upon two extreme associations, a collapse
of oppositions hinging upon the unstable meaning of “all”: the “all” that
is everything is contrasted with the “all, that’s nothing,” the speaker. The
tense change occurring in the second half of the stanza reveals a past state
of existence that is similarly contrasted with whatever else may exist. The
speaker uses first-person plural, connecting some “I” with some “you” to
indicate a joint existence that distinguishes itself from “ought else,” and
participates in a mutual destruction of self and world. The past existence,
mortal and destructive, leads to a more concentrated description of the
origins of the present nothing.
The beginning of stanza four denotes this you as a “her,” whose death
is, in some combination with love, responsible for the ruin and rebirth of
the speaker. But the speaker actually originates “Of the first nothing, the
elixir grown.” This statement of origins posits a creation that, not only is
“nothing,” but also has come from nothing. The creation from nothing
replicates the paradox of the first Chapter of Genesis, namely that God’s
initial act of creation arose from nothing.32 The “Nocturnal” twists this
paradox, describing a something that is a nothing that has been created
from nothing; it thus asserts that “nothing arises from nothing.” These
paradoxical origins adhere to the logic of the via negativa, and the argument arrives at the proposition fully stated in the first line of the final
stanza, “I am none” (37). Nothing comes of the first nothing—nothing
(affirmative) is created out of nothing (affirmative).
I will forego investigating the precise past relationship between “I”
and “she,” or assessing the precise role love plays in the creation of the
nothing which is the poem. The logic of negative theology is never simple,
even though it be manifest. However, it does disentangle much of what is
perplexing in the poem, creating new meaning for it. The poem itself is
not a riddle. It is a paradox that may not be resolved. If you come to the
poem comfortably embracing the paradox that “nothing” is grammatically
substantive as well as affirmative, and if you accept that “nothing,” as an
affirmative category of existence, can neither be “made” nor “missed,”
then you can read the poem literally. Like the love in “Negative Love,”
this nothing remains infinitely determinate and infinitely indeterminate.
The temporal setting of “A Nocturnal,” contained in lines 1–2 and
lines 42–45, shows the maximum and minimum limitations of this “nothing”: perpetual now in perpetual motion. The opening lines, “‘Tis the
32This paradox, widely debated in Donne’s own time (See Booth, “Ideating Nothing,”
203), is discussed and embraced by both Saint Augustine and Nicholas of Cusa.
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year’s midnight, and it is the day’s / Lucy’s, who scarce seven hours herself unmasks,” utilize the dummy pronoun “it” and the verb “is” to situate
the poem in a particular and permanent temporal location. The final four
lines locate the poem more specifically as a perpetual hour, midnight, at
which time the poem is in perpetual preparation by way of a vigil: “Since
she enjoys her long night’s festival, / Let me prepare towards her, and call
/ This hour her vigil, and her eve, since this / Both the year’s, and the
day’s deep midnight is.” “This,” both as modifier and pronoun, does the
business of naming. First, it names the hyper-present (“This hour”), permanently fixing its time as both infinitely determinate (now) and infinitely
indeterminate (eternity). “This,” in pronoun form, renames nothing specifically: It names both the poem (a nocturnal upon S. Lucy’s Day) and its
speaker (the nothing “preparing towards”), merging the two, now and
always, nothing and all, via the copulate verb “is.”
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